Commit 4732de71 authored by Matt Johnston's avatar Matt Johnston
Browse files


parent 171456c6
2016.74 - 21 July 2016
- Security: Message printout was vulnerable to format string injection.
If specific usernames including "%" symbols can be created on a system
(validated by getpwnam()) then an attacker could run arbitrary code as root
when connecting to Dropbear server.
A dbclient user who can control username or host arguments could potentially
run arbitrary code as the dbclient user. This could be a problem if scripts
or webpages pass untrusted input to the dbclient program.
- Security: dropbearconvert import of OpenSSH keys could run arbitrary code as
the local dropbearconvert user when parsing malicious key files
- Security: dbclient could run arbitrary code as the local dbclient user if
particular -m or -c arguments are provided. This could be an issue where
dbclient is used in scripts.
- Security: dbclient or dropbear server could expose process memory to the
running user if compiled with DEBUG_TRACE and running with -v
The security issues were reported by an anonymous researcher working with
Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
- Fix port forwarding failure when connecting to domains that have both
IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
- Fix 100% CPU use while waiting for rekey to complete. Thanks to Zhang Hui P
for the patch
2016.73 - 18 March 2016
- Support syslog in dbclient, option -o usesyslog=yes. Patch from Konstantin Tokarev
dropbear (2016.74-0.1) unstable; urgency=low
* New upstream release.
-- Matt Johnston <> Thu, 21 Jul 2016 22:51:57 +0800
dropbear (2016.73-0.1) unstable; urgency=low
* New upstream release.
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