Commit c6e912f9 authored by Matt Johnston's avatar Matt Johnston

merge 2016.74

parents dd19d73d 1df5c971
......@@ -21,3 +21,4 @@ af074dbcb68ff8670b3818e0d66d5dc6f1bd5877 0 iQIcBAABCgAGBQJWVdQfAAoJEPSYMBLCC7qs+
926e7275cef4f4f2a4251597ee4814748394824c 0 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
fd1981f41c626a969f07b4823848deaefef3c8aa 0 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
70705edee9dd29cd3d410f19fbd15cc3489313e2 0 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
9030ffdbe5625e35ed7189ab84a41dfc8d413e9c 0 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
......@@ -53,3 +53,4 @@ cbd674d63cd4f3781464a8d4056a5506c8ae926f DROPBEAR_2015.67
9a944a243f08be6b22d32f166a0690eb4872462b DROPBEAR_2015.71
78b12b6549be08b0bea3da329b2578060a76ca31 DROPBEAR_2016.72
309e1c4a87682b6ca7d80b8555a1db416c3cb7ac DROPBEAR_2016.73
0ed3d2bbf956cb8a9bf0f4b5a86b7dd9688205cb DROPBEAR_2016.74
2016.74 - 21 July 2016
- Security: Message printout was vulnerable to format string injection.
If specific usernames including "%" symbols can be created on a system
(validated by getpwnam()) then an attacker could run arbitrary code as root
when connecting to Dropbear server.
A dbclient user who can control username or host arguments could potentially
run arbitrary code as the dbclient user. This could be a problem if scripts
or webpages pass untrusted input to the dbclient program.
- Security: dropbearconvert import of OpenSSH keys could run arbitrary code as
the local dropbearconvert user when parsing malicious key files
- Security: dbclient could run arbitrary code as the local dbclient user if
particular -m or -c arguments are provided. This could be an issue where
dbclient is used in scripts.
- Security: dbclient or dropbear server could expose process memory to the
running user if compiled with DEBUG_TRACE and running with -v
The security issues were reported by an anonymous researcher working with
Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure www.beyondsecurity.com/ssd.html
- Fix port forwarding failure when connecting to domains that have both
IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. The bug was introduced in 2015.68
- Fix 100% CPU use while waiting for rekey to complete. Thanks to Zhang Hui P
for the patch
2016.73 - 18 March 2016
- Support syslog in dbclient, option -o usesyslog=yes. Patch from Konstantin Tokarev
......
......@@ -141,9 +141,10 @@ void buf_incrwritepos(buffer* buf, unsigned int incr) {
/* increment the position by incr, negative values are allowed, to
* decrement the pos*/
void buf_incrpos(buffer* buf, int incr) {
if (incr > BUF_MAX_INCR ||
(unsigned int)((int)buf->pos + incr) > buf->len
|| ((int)buf->pos + incr) < 0) {
if (incr > BUF_MAX_INCR
|| incr < -BUF_MAX_INCR
|| (unsigned int)((int)buf->pos + incr) > buf->len
|| ((int)buf->pos + incr) < 0) {
dropbear_exit("Bad buf_incrpos");
}
buf->pos += incr;
......@@ -184,7 +185,7 @@ void buf_putbyte(buffer* buf, unsigned char val) {
* the next len bytes from that position can be used */
unsigned char* buf_getptr(buffer* buf, unsigned int len) {
if (buf->pos + len > buf->len) {
if (len > BUF_MAX_INCR || buf->pos + len > buf->len) {
dropbear_exit("Bad buf_getptr");
}
return &buf->data[buf->pos];
......@@ -194,7 +195,7 @@ unsigned char* buf_getptr(buffer* buf, unsigned int len) {
* This allows writing past the used length, but not past the size */
unsigned char* buf_getwriteptr(buffer* buf, unsigned int len) {
if (buf->pos + len > buf->size) {
if (len > BUF_MAX_INCR || buf->pos + len > buf->size) {
dropbear_exit("Bad buf_getwriteptr");
}
return &buf->data[buf->pos];
......
......@@ -98,29 +98,30 @@ int main(int argc, char ** argv) {
#endif /* DBMULTI stuff */
static void cli_dropbear_exit(int exitcode, const char* format, va_list param) {
char exitmsg[150];
char fullmsg[300];
char fmtbuf[300];
char exitmsg[500];
/* Note that exit message must be rendered before session cleanup */
/* Render the formatted exit message */
vsnprintf(exitmsg, sizeof(exitmsg), format, param);
/* Add the prefix depending on session/auth state */
if (!sessinitdone) {
snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), "Exited: %s",
format);
snprintf(fullmsg, sizeof(fullmsg), "Exited: %s", exitmsg);
} else {
snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf),
snprintf(fullmsg, sizeof(fullmsg),
"Connection to %[email protected]%s:%s exited: %s",
cli_opts.username, cli_opts.remotehost,
cli_opts.remoteport, format);
cli_opts.remoteport, exitmsg);
}
/* Arguments to the exit printout may be unsafe to use after session_cleanup() */
vsnprintf(exitmsg, sizeof(exitmsg), fmtbuf, param);
/* Do the cleanup first, since then the terminal will be reset */
session_cleanup();
/* Avoid printing onwards from terminal cruft */
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
dropbear_log(LOG_INFO, "%s", exitmsg);;
dropbear_log(LOG_INFO, "%s", fullmsg);
exit(exitcode);
}
......
......@@ -529,21 +529,6 @@ check_algo(const char* algo_name, algo_type *algos)
return NULL;
}
static void
try_add_algo(const char *algo_name, algo_type *algos,
const char *algo_desc, algo_type * new_algos, int *num_ret)
{
algo_type *match_algo = check_algo(algo_name, algos);
if (!match_algo)
{
dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "This Dropbear program does not support '%s' %s algorithm", algo_name, algo_desc);
return;
}
new_algos[*num_ret] = *match_algo;
(*num_ret)++;
}
/* Checks a user provided comma-separated algorithm list for available
* options. Any that are not acceptable are removed in-place. Returns the
* number of valid algorithms. */
......@@ -551,30 +536,43 @@ int
check_user_algos(const char* user_algo_list, algo_type * algos,
const char *algo_desc)
{
algo_type new_algos[MAX_PROPOSED_ALGO];
/* this has two passes. first we sweep through the given list of
* algorithms and mark them as usable=2 in the algo_type[] array... */
int num_ret = 0;
algo_type new_algos[MAX_PROPOSED_ALGO+1];
char *work_list = m_strdup(user_algo_list);
char *last_name = work_list;
char *start = work_list;
char *c;
for (c = work_list; *c; c++)
int n;
/* So we can iterate and look for null terminator */
memset(new_algos, 0x0, sizeof(new_algos));
for (c = work_list, n = 0; ; c++)
{
if (*c == ',')
{
char oc = *c;
if (n >= MAX_PROPOSED_ALGO) {
dropbear_exit("Too many algorithms '%s'", user_algo_list);
}
if (*c == ',' || *c == '\0') {
algo_type *match_algo = NULL;
*c = '\0';
try_add_algo(last_name, algos, algo_desc, new_algos, &num_ret);
match_algo = check_algo(start, algos);
if (match_algo) {
if (check_algo(start, new_algos)) {
TRACE(("Skip repeated algorithm '%s'", start))
} else {
new_algos[n] = *match_algo;
n++;
}
} else {
dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "This Dropbear program does not support '%s' %s algorithm", start, algo_desc);
}
c++;
last_name = c;
start = c;
}
if (oc == '\0') {
break;
}
}
try_add_algo(last_name, algos, algo_desc, new_algos, &num_ret);
m_free(work_list);
new_algos[num_ret].name = NULL;
/* Copy one more as a blank delimiter */
memcpy(algos, new_algos, sizeof(*new_algos) * (num_ret+1));
return num_ret;
/* n+1 to include a null terminator */
memcpy(algos, new_algos, sizeof(*new_algos) * (n+1));
return n;
}
#endif /* DROPBEAR_USER_ALGO_LIST */
......@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ static void read_session_identification() {
}
if (!done) {
TRACE(("err: %s for '%s'\n", strerror(errno), linebuf))
TRACE(("error reading remote ident: %s\n", strerror(errno)))
ses.remoteclosed();
} else {
/* linebuf is already null terminated */
......
dropbear (2016.74-0.1) unstable; urgency=low
* New upstream release.
-- Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au> Thu, 21 Jul 2016 22:51:57 +0800
dropbear (2016.73-0.1) unstable; urgency=low
* New upstream release.
......
......@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ static int openssh_write(const char *filename, sign_key *key,
static int dropbear_write(const char*filename, sign_key * key);
static sign_key *dropbear_read(const char* filename);
static int toint(unsigned u);
#if 0
static int sshcom_encrypted(const char *filename, char **comment);
static struct ssh2_userkey *sshcom_read(const char *filename, char *passphrase);
......@@ -243,12 +245,11 @@ static int ber_read_id_len(void *source, int sourcelen,
if ((*p & 0x1F) == 0x1F) {
*id = 0;
while (*p & 0x80) {
*id = (*id << 7) | (*p & 0x7F);
p++, sourcelen--;
if (sourcelen == 0)
return -1;
*id = (*id << 7) | (*p & 0x7F);
}
*id = (*id << 7) | (*p & 0x7F);
p++, sourcelen--;
} else {
*id = *p & 0x1F;
......@@ -259,19 +260,26 @@ static int ber_read_id_len(void *source, int sourcelen,
return -1;
if (*p & 0x80) {
unsigned len;
int n = *p & 0x7F;
p++, sourcelen--;
if (sourcelen < n)
return -1;
*length = 0;
len = 0;
while (n--)
*length = (*length << 8) | (*p++);
len = (len << 8) | (*p++);
sourcelen -= n;
*length = toint(len);
} else {
*length = *p;
p++, sourcelen--;
}
if (*length < 0) {
printf("Negative ASN.1 length\n");
return -1;
}
return p - (unsigned char *) source;
}
......@@ -469,7 +477,7 @@ static struct openssh_key *load_openssh_key(const char *filename)
m_burn(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
return ret;
error:
error:
m_burn(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if (ret) {
if (ret->keyblob) {
......@@ -584,8 +592,9 @@ static sign_key *openssh_read(const char *filename, char * UNUSED(passphrase))
/* Expect the SEQUENCE header. Take its absence as a failure to decrypt. */
ret = ber_read_id_len(p, key->keyblob_len, &id, &len, &flags);
p += ret;
if (ret < 0 || id != 16) {
errmsg = "ASN.1 decoding failure - wrong password?";
if (ret < 0 || id != 16 || len < 0 ||
key->keyblob+key->keyblob_len-p < len) {
errmsg = "ASN.1 decoding failure";
goto error;
}
......@@ -619,7 +628,7 @@ static sign_key *openssh_read(const char *filename, char * UNUSED(passphrase))
ret = ber_read_id_len(p, key->keyblob+key->keyblob_len-p,
&id, &len, &flags);
p += ret;
if (ret < 0 || id != 2 ||
if (ret < 0 || id != 2 || len < 0 ||
key->keyblob+key->keyblob_len-p < len) {
errmsg = "ASN.1 decoding failure";
goto error;
......@@ -685,7 +694,7 @@ static sign_key *openssh_read(const char *filename, char * UNUSED(passphrase))
&id, &len, &flags);
p += ret;
/* id==4 for octet string */
if (ret < 0 || id != 4 ||
if (ret < 0 || id != 4 || len < 0 ||
key->keyblob+key->keyblob_len-p < len) {
errmsg = "ASN.1 decoding failure";
goto error;
......@@ -699,7 +708,7 @@ static sign_key *openssh_read(const char *filename, char * UNUSED(passphrase))
&id, &len, &flags);
p += ret;
/* id==0 */
if (ret < 0 || id != 0) {
if (ret < 0 || id != 0 || len < 0) {
errmsg = "ASN.1 decoding failure";
goto error;
}
......@@ -708,7 +717,7 @@ static sign_key *openssh_read(const char *filename, char * UNUSED(passphrase))
&id, &len, &flags);
p += ret;
/* id==6 for object */
if (ret < 0 || id != 6 ||
if (ret < 0 || id != 6 || len < 0 ||
key->keyblob+key->keyblob_len-p < len) {
errmsg = "ASN.1 decoding failure";
goto error;
......@@ -747,7 +756,7 @@ static sign_key *openssh_read(const char *filename, char * UNUSED(passphrase))
&id, &len, &flags);
p += ret;
/* id==1 */
if (ret < 0 || id != 1) {
if (ret < 0 || id != 1 || len < 0) {
errmsg = "ASN.1 decoding failure";
goto error;
}
......@@ -756,7 +765,7 @@ static sign_key *openssh_read(const char *filename, char * UNUSED(passphrase))
&id, &len, &flags);
p += ret;
/* id==3 for bit string */
if (ret < 0 || id != 3 ||
if (ret < 0 || id != 3 || len < 0 ||
key->keyblob+key->keyblob_len-p < len) {
errmsg = "ASN.1 decoding failure";
goto error;
......@@ -1381,7 +1390,7 @@ static struct sshcom_key *load_sshcom_key(const char *filename)
memset(ret->keyblob, 0, ret->keyblob_size);
m_free(ret->keyblob);
}
memset(&ret, 0, sizeof(ret));
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret));
m_free(ret);
}
return NULL;
......@@ -1409,11 +1418,12 @@ int sshcom_encrypted(const char *filename, char **comment)
pos = 8;
if (key->keyblob_len < pos+4)
goto done; /* key is far too short */
pos += 4 + GET_32BIT(key->keyblob + pos); /* skip key type */
if (key->keyblob_len < pos+4)
len = toint(GET_32BIT(key->keyblob + pos));
if (len < 0 || len > key->keyblob_len - pos - 4)
goto done; /* key is far too short */
len = GET_32BIT(key->keyblob + pos); /* find cipher-type length */
if (key->keyblob_len < pos+4+len)
pos += 4 + len; /* skip key type */
len = toint(GET_32BIT(key->keyblob + pos)); /* find cipher-type length */
if (len < 0 || len > key->keyblob_len - pos - 4)
goto done; /* cipher type string is incomplete */
if (len != 4 || 0 != memcmp(key->keyblob + pos + 4, "none", 4))
answer = 1;
......@@ -1422,15 +1432,14 @@ int sshcom_encrypted(const char *filename, char **comment)
*comment = dupstr(key->comment);
memset(key->keyblob, 0, key->keyblob_size);
m_free(key->keyblob);
memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
m_free(key);
return answer;
}
static int sshcom_read_mpint(void *data, int len, struct mpint_pos *ret)
{
int bits;
int bytes;
unsigned bits, bytes;
unsigned char *d = (unsigned char *) data;
if (len < 4)
......@@ -1483,7 +1492,7 @@ sign_key *sshcom_read(const char *filename, char *passphrase)
struct ssh2_userkey *ret = NULL, *retkey;
const struct ssh_signkey *alg;
unsigned char *blob = NULL;
int blobsize, publen, privlen;
int blobsize = 0, publen, privlen;
if (!key)
return NULL;
......@@ -1603,8 +1612,8 @@ sign_key *sshcom_read(const char *filename, char *passphrase)
/*
* Strip away the containing string to get to the real meat.
*/
len = GET_32BIT(ciphertext);
if (len > cipherlen-4) {
len = toint(GET_32BIT(ciphertext));
if (len < 0 || len > cipherlen-4) {
errmsg = "containing string was ill-formed";
goto error;
}
......@@ -1671,7 +1680,8 @@ sign_key *sshcom_read(const char *filename, char *passphrase)
publen = pos;
pos += put_mp(blob+pos, x.start, x.bytes);
privlen = pos - publen;
}
} else
return NULL;
dropbear_assert(privlen > 0); /* should have bombed by now if not */
......@@ -1695,7 +1705,7 @@ sign_key *sshcom_read(const char *filename, char *passphrase)
}
memset(key->keyblob, 0, key->keyblob_size);
m_free(key->keyblob);
memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
m_free(key);
return ret;
}
......@@ -1908,3 +1918,27 @@ int sshcom_write(const char *filename, sign_key *key,
return ret;
}
#endif /* ssh.com stuff disabled */
/* From PuTTY misc.c */
static int toint(unsigned u)
{
/*
* Convert an unsigned to an int, without running into the
* undefined behaviour which happens by the strict C standard if
* the value overflows. You'd hope that sensible compilers would
* do the sensible thing in response to a cast, but actually I
* don't trust modern compilers not to do silly things like
* assuming that _obviously_ you wouldn't have caused an overflow
* and so they can elide an 'if (i < 0)' test immediately after
* the cast.
*
* Sensible compilers ought of course to optimise this entire
* function into 'just return the input value'!
*/
if (u <= (unsigned)INT_MAX)
return (int)u;
else if (u >= (unsigned)INT_MIN) /* wrap in cast _to_ unsigned is OK */
return INT_MIN + (int)(u - (unsigned)INT_MIN);
else
return INT_MIN; /* fallback; should never occur on binary machines */
}
......@@ -144,31 +144,33 @@ void svr_session(int sock, int childpipe) {
/* failure exit - format must be <= 100 chars */
void svr_dropbear_exit(int exitcode, const char* format, va_list param) {
char fmtbuf[300];
char exitmsg[150];
char fullmsg[300];
int i;
/* Render the formatted exit message */
vsnprintf(exitmsg, sizeof(exitmsg), format, param);
/* Add the prefix depending on session/auth state */
if (!sessinitdone) {
/* before session init */
snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf),
"Early exit: %s", format);
snprintf(fullmsg, sizeof(fullmsg), "Early exit: %s", exitmsg);
} else if (ses.authstate.authdone) {
/* user has authenticated */
snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf),
snprintf(fullmsg, sizeof(fullmsg),
"Exit (%s): %s",
ses.authstate.pw_name, format);
ses.authstate.pw_name, exitmsg);
} else if (ses.authstate.pw_name) {
/* we have a potential user */
snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf),
snprintf(fullmsg, sizeof(fullmsg),
"Exit before auth (user '%s', %u fails): %s",
ses.authstate.pw_name, ses.authstate.failcount, format);
ses.authstate.pw_name, ses.authstate.failcount, exitmsg);
} else {
/* before userauth */
snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf),
"Exit before auth: %s", format);
snprintf(fullmsg, sizeof(fullmsg), "Exit before auth: %s", exitmsg);
}
_dropbear_log(LOG_INFO, fmtbuf, param);
dropbear_log(LOG_INFO, "%s", fullmsg);
#if DROPBEAR_VFORK
/* For uclinux only the main server process should cleanup - we don't want
......
......@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
*******************************************************************/
#ifndef DROPBEAR_VERSION
#define DROPBEAR_VERSION "2016.73"
#define DROPBEAR_VERSION "2016.74"
#endif
#define LOCAL_IDENT "SSH-2.0-dropbear_" DROPBEAR_VERSION
......
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