network timestamps (in tshark)

improbable, roughly 2**-1023
Regression in 0.49

of the pointer to the data instead of the whole size of struct openssh_key
is cleared. Correct the size calculation as detected by Coverity CID 1191543.

if using bundled libraries

Prefer diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 (2048 bit) over
diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 (1024 bit).

Due to meet-in-the-middle attacks the effective key length of
three key 3DES is 112 bits. AES is stronger and faster then 3DES.

Prefer to delay the start of compression until after authentication
has completed. This avoids exposing compression code to attacks
from unauthenticated users.

(github pull request #9)

(fix pull request #6)

(fixup of pull request #7)

    When corrupted packet is received negative length of packet is
    displayed.
    (re-apply of pull request #8)

My agent exposes both conventional keys and certs (ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com) and I want dropbear to be able to use the former.

fails. Based on patch from Peter Korsgaard